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TIRE JOCKEY SERVICE, INC. V COMMONWEALTH: IF A USED
TIRE FALLS INTO PENNSYLVANIA AND NO ONE IS THERE
TO REGULATE IT, WILL THE COURTS MAKE A SOUND?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Solid Waste
Management Act (SWMA or Act) in 1980 to combat the health,
environmental and economic hazards caused by inadequate solid
waste management practices.' While the SWMA contains an exten-
sive list of definitions applying to words and phrases used in the
Act, it neglects to define the simple, but critical, term "waste."'2 As
such, one must look to the associated Residual Waste Regulations
(RWRs) for clarification as to what materials are to be regulated
under the SWMA.3 Tire Jockey Service, Inc. (TJS), a New Jersey
corporation, challenged the applicability of the SWMA and RWRs
to discarded used tires accumulated at its Pennsylvania facility for
processing.4
In particular, TJS claimed used tires are not waste at all, as they
fall under express exceptions to the definition of: (1) waste for
materials that can be recycled by being employed as an effective
substitute for a commercial product;5 and (2) processing for ac-
tions that merely constitute "sizing, shaping and sorting."'6 Alterna-
tively, TJS contended that its facility is also expressly exempted
from regulation under the SWMA because it is a collection or
processing center that handles only source-separated recyclable ma-
terial.7 In response, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmen-
tal Protection (DEP) interpreted the SWMA and RWRs to include
all discarded tires and tire derived materials, citing associated
hazards to health and public safety to underscore a need for proper
regulatory oversight.8
1. See 35 PA.STAT. ANN. § 6018.102 (West 2003) (declaring policy and legisla-
tive findings of SWMA).
2. See id. § 6018.103 (2003) (defining terms used in Act).
3. See 25 PA. CODE § 287.1 (2008) (defining terms in regulation).
4. See TireJockey Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 915 A.2d 1165, 1169 (Pa.
2007) (stating issues and factual background of case).
5. See id. at 1180-81 (citing central argument of TJS).
6. See id. at 1178 (noting exception to processing classification).
7. See id. at 1183 (discussing arguments in procedural history of case).
8. See id. at 1179 (noting position of DEP).
(139)
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This Note reviews the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's deci-
sion to reinstate the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board's
(EHB) order in Tire Jockey Service, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania (Tire Jockey), 9 thereby upholding the applicability of the
SWMA and RWRs to discarded used tires.10 Part II of this Note
presents the relevant facts, associated arguments and procedural
history of Tire Jockey.'1 Part III presents background information
essential to this Note's perspective, addressing the role of the EHB,
pertinent sections of the SWMA and RWRs, precedent used in the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's analysis and strict criminal liabil-
ity under the Act. 12 Part IV summarizes the Court's reasoning in
TireJockey.1' Part V analyzes the court's position, commenting on
similar initiatives in other areas of Pennsylvania environmental law
and the particular importance of regulating used tire processing to
ensure public health and safety. 14 Finally, Part VI expounds on the
potential impact of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision
to uphold a broad interpretation of the SWMA. 15
II. FACTS
Alfred J. Pignataro, Jr. (Pignataro) is the president and chief
operating officer of TJS, a NewJersey waste tire processing corpora-
tion operating in Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania.' 6 TJS utilizes a pat-
ented tire processing method that involves large-scale acquisition of
discarded whole used tires, segregating those that can be reused as
automobile tires by means of visual inspection and inflation test-
9. 915 A.2d 1165, 1169 (Pa. 2007).
10. See id. (addressing classification of used tires as waste under SWMA and
RWRs).
11. For a full discussion of case facts, see infra notes 16-42 and accompanying
text.
12. For a full discussion of relevant background, see infra notes 43-108 and
accompanying text.
13. For a narrative analysis of the court's decision, see infra notes 109-31 and
accompanying text.
14. For a critical analysis of the court's decision, see infra notes 132-65 and
accompanying text.
15. For a full discussion of impact, see infra notes 166-74 and accompanying
text.
16. See TireJockey Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 915 A.2d 1165, 1169-70 (Pa.
2007) (citing facts of case). Mr. Pignataro is the president, chief operating officer
and majority shareholder of Tire Jockey Services. Id. He is also responsible for
daily operations of the company, located at the USX Industrial Park in Fairless
Hills, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Id.
2
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ing. 17 TJS cuts the remaining tires into pieces and stacks them on
pallets to sell for further processing.18
Pignataro was formerly the president and minority shareholder
of Tire Derived Products, Inc. (TDP), a waste tire processing facility
in Elizabeth, New Jersey. 19 Though it never held a Certificate of
Occupancy from the city, TDP operated until financial difficulties
and disputes with the property owner led it to consider reloca-
tion.20 In September of 1999, Pignataro contacted the DEP and
learned that a DEP permit would be necessary to open a tire
processing facility in Pennsylvania. 21 Despite denial of a requested
grant and the fact that TJS had not applied for any of the required
local or state permits, the company entered into a five-year lease at
the Fairless Hills facility and began operations, accepting discarded
whole tires in June of 2000.22
Thereafter, the DEP inspected the Fairless Hills facility and,
after observing ongoing residual waste processing, told Pignataro to
cease operations until obtaining the requisite local and state per-
mits. 23 Following the inspection, the DEP filed a Notice of Viola-
tion (NOV), requesting that TJS submit a proposed plan and
schedule for correcting the discovered violations. 24 Two more DEP
17. See Tire jockey Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2001-155-K, 2002 WL
31884559, at *2 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd. Dec. 23, 2002) (describing progression of tire
processing).
18. See id. at *3 (noting cut components can be used as raw ingredients in
products such as rubber mats, playground surfacing or tire-derived fuel).
19. See id. at *8 (noting TDP was originally located in Newark, New Jersey).
TDP's operation procedure was similar to that of TJS. Id.
20. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1170 n.3 (discussing Pignataro's operations in
NewJersey). TDP vacated the Elizabeth facilities in April of 2000, leaving 100,000
waste tires at the site. Id. In December of 2000, the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection (NJDEP) issued a notice of violation (NOV) for operat-
ing the facility without a permit and leaving a potentially hazardous situation. Id.
In May of 2001, the NJDEP considered the site such a serious environmental threat
that it sought remedy in the New Jersey Superior Courts. Id. After the City of
Elizabeth spent $364,000 in 2001 to properly dispose of the remaining tires, the
NewJersey Superior Court held TDP liable for $300,000 in statutory penalties. Id.
21. See id. at 1170-71 (citing fact that Pignataro was aware he needed DEP
permit).
22. See id. (describing steps undertaken without proper permitting).
23. See id. at 1171-72 (discussing DEP's instructions to Pignataro). Specifi-
cally, DEP officials observed many cut, processed and baled used tires, as well as
employees operating tire-processing machinery. Id. They referred Pignataro to
the SWMA and RWRs, issuing a NOV on July 26, 2000 for operating the facility
without a local Use and Occupancy permit. Id.
24. See id. at 1172 (requiring TJS to submit plan and schedule to correct viola-
tions). The NOV cited TJS for processing used tires without a residual waste-
processing permit in violation of the SWMA and RWRs. Id.
2009]
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inspections followed, where officials observed additional tires
brought onsite since the DEP's initial inspection. 25
After failing a subsequent fourth inspection, TJS applied for a
determination of applicability under the DEP permit process,
claiming the tires at the facility did not constitute waste as defined
by DEP rules and RWRs. 26 A fifth follow-up inspection revealed ap-
proximately fifty thousand tires at the site, of which Pignataro could
not provide records evidencing the number of incoming and outgo-
ing used tires at the Fairless Hills Facility. 27 TJS then responded to
a DEP request for more permit-related information by submitting
an incomplete compliance history that failed to mention the previ-
ous NOVs issued to the facility. 28 Pignataro also failed to disclose
the existence of the TDP facility in New Jersey.29
On January 22, 2001, the DEP issued an Administrative Order
and Civil Penalty Assessment, finding that TJS had operated a
residual waste processing facility without a permit since June of
2000.30 Three subsequent inspections showed that TJS ignored the
order and continued to bring additional tires into the facility.31 In
May of 2001, NewJersey authorities informed the DEP of its actions
against Pignataro and TDP, spurring the DEP to reject TJS's permit
application.3 2
TJS appealed the DEP's order and permit denial to the EHB. 33
TJS claimed its used tires are not waste as defined by the SWMA
because they fall within SWMA exceptions for: (1) waste material
that can be shown to be recyclable by being employed as an effec-
tive substitute for a commercial product; and (2) the processing of
25. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1173 (stating DEP observations). Following the
third failed inspection, the DEP issued a second NOV to TJS. Id.
26. See id. (explaining TJS claims).
27. See id. (describing findings at facility).
28. See id. (discussing TJS response to DEP request for additional informa-
tion). TJS also failed to provide an accurate figure for required bonding, main-
taining that bonding was only needed for waste tires and most or all of the tires at
its facility were not waste tires. Id.
29. See id. (noting TJS failure to disclose NewJersey facility).
30. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1174 (listing activities and associated violations).
31. See id. (showing TJS' ignoring DEP Order).
32. See id. (citing actions undertaken in NewJersey as one reason for denial of
permit). The DEP held that TJS failed to show its operations were in compliance
with permit terms and conditions. Id. The DEP also noted that TJS's deficient
compliance history and divergent views on the issue of bonding contributed to the
rejection. Id. Furthermore, TJS "demonstrated a lack of intention or ability to
comply with environmental laws." Id.
33. See Tire Jockey Service v. Dep't of Envil. Prot., No. 2001-155-K, 2002 WL
31884559, at *29 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd. Dec. 23, 2002) (discussing TJS's appeal follow-
ing denial of permit).
4
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source-separated recyclable materials. 34 After considering the plain
language of the regulation and crediting the DEP's interpretation
as reasonable, the EHB held that used tires do not fall within the
claimed exceptions. 35 To support its finding, the EHB looked at
the explicit language and historical background of the RWRs and
recent consistent precedent. 36 In addition, the EHB also agreed
with the DEP that source-separated materials include only those
materials specifically listed in the regulation, citing environmental
and safety hazards to further support refusal of TJS's expansionary
interpretation. 37
TJS appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania,
which vacated the EHB's order.3 8  The Commonwealth Court
found that TJS does not process or reclaim used tires, but merely
sizes, shapes and sorts them, activities considered inconsistent with
the term "processing." 39 The court also held that used tires are no
longer waste "once it can be shown that the tires will be recycled by
being used or reused as an ingredient in an industrial process to
make a product or by being employed in a particular function or
application as an effective substitute for a commercial product. ' 40
The Commonwealth Court's decision broadly interpreted when, in
the process of recycling, waste is no longer considered waste.41 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted the DEP's appeal. 42
34. See id. (setting forth TIS's SWMA-related contentions).
35. See id. at *35 (stating conclusion on issue).
36. See id. at **31-35 (supporting decision to include accumulated tires under
waste subject to SWMA). As consistent with the DEP's view, the exception to
SWMA coverage only applies when the material is actually being recycled or re-
used. Id. at *31. The DEP also made a conscious decision to tie the definition of
waste to the manner in which the material is produced. Id. at *33. Despite amend-
ment to the SWMA in 2001, this process-oriented approach was not changed. Id.
at *34.
37. See id. at **35-38 (rejecting argument that waste tires constitute source-
separated recyclable materials). The EHB found the DEP's interpretation here
reasonable and gave it credit. Id. at *36. As the regulation itself does not include
waste tires under its list of source separated recyclable materials, there is no man-
date that the DEP or EHB transplant waste tires into the list despite the list's
nonexclusive context. Id. In addition, source separated recyclable materials can be
recycled without significant risk to human health and the environment, something
that cannot be said for used tires. Id. at *37.
38. See TireJockey Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 836 A.2d 1026, 1027 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2007) (vacating EHB order).
39. See id. at 1030 (finding that TJS' operations did not constitute
"processing").
40. Id. at 1030 (stating reasoning behind holding).
41. See id. at 1029-30 (discussing timing issue in recycling process).
42. See Tire Jockey v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 915 A.2d 1165, 1178 (granting DEP's
appeal).
2009]
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Role of the Department of Environmental Protection and the
Environmental Hearing Board in Pennsylvania
Environmental Regulation
The Pennsylvania DEP serves to "protect Pennsylvania's air,
land and water from pollution, and to provide for the health and
safety of its citizens through a cleaner environment. ' 43 The EHB
functions as a trial court with jurisdictional power limited to the
review of final actions of the DEP.44 Appeals of EHB actions go to
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania and thereafter, if permit-
ted, to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 4 5
The EHB reviews cases de novo, basing its decisions solely upon
the evidence before the Board. 46 When assessing the plain lan-
guage of a statute promulgated by the DEP, the EHB defers to the
DEP's interpretation of the regulation unless it is clearly errone-
ous. 47 A reviewing court can disturb agency determinations only
43. Department of Environmental Protection, Environmental Eduction: DEP
Environmental Education Initiatives, http://www.depweb.state.pa.us/enved/cwp/
view.asp?a=3&q=473224 (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (describing mission of DEP).
44. See William Hofmann & Steven Horst, EHB Review, The EHB: DEP's Friend
or Foe? Environmental Hearing Board Review, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 173 (2004)
(describing original composition of DEP). The Pennsylvania DEP was originally
bifurcated into two branches: a judicial branch represented by the EHB and a
legislative branch composed of the Environmental Quality Board. Id. The two de-
partments were separated in 1988 by the Environmental Hearing Board Act. Id.
45. See id. at 174 (describing appeal process and view of state courts on EHB
decisions).
46. See id. at 175 (discussing EHB standard of review); see also Smedley v. Dep't
of Envtl. Prot., No. 97-253-K, 2001 WL 178234, at *14 (reviewing abuse of discre-
tion standard). The EHB uses de novo review to ensure DEP decisions conform to
the law and are otherwise reasonable and appropriate. See Hofmann & Horst, supra
note 44, at 176 (citing reasons for utilizing de novo standard of review).
47. See Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. N. Am. Refractories Co., 791 A.2d 461, 466 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002) (holding that EHB erred in refusing to defer to DEP interpreta-
tion when such interpretation was reasonable); see also Pelton v. Dep't of Pub. Wel-
fare, 523 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Pa. 1987) (citing well-settled precedent requiring courts
to defer to administrative agency's interpretation of own regulations unless inter-
pretation is unreasonable); see also T.R.A.S.H., Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 574 A.2d
721, 724 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (noting that interpretation of statute by those
charged with execution should be given great weight and only disregarded if clear
that interpretation is incorrect). See Starrv. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 607 A.2d 321, 323
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (limiting state court review of EHB decisions to assessing
"whether an error of law has been committed, constitutional rights have been vio-
lated, or any findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence."); see also
Mathies Coal Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 559 A.2d 506, 509 (Pa. 1989) (stating
limitations on state courts' review of EHB decisions).
6
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upon obvious abuse of discretion or arbitrary exercise of regulatory
duties.48
B. The Solid Waste Management Act and the Residual Waste
Regulations
The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the SWMA on
July 7, 1980, and it endures virtually unchanged as Pennsylvania's
leading statute governing solid waste management.49 The Act regu-
lates municipal, residual and hazardous waste while controlling all
associated enforcement and permit processes. 50 The threshold
question for applicability of the SWMA to a party's conduct is
whether the involved material constitutes "waste. ''51 The statute
contains a broad definition of "solid waste," but it neglects to define
the basic term "waste. '" 52
Legislative intent behind the statute focused on the public
health hazards, environmental pollution and economic loss created
by inadequate solid waste practices. 53 By establishing a cooperative
state and local assistance program for comprehensive solid waste
management, the SWMA aims to facilitate proper solid waste main-
tenance and resource conservation. 54 While the DEP administers
the SWMA, the Environmental Quality Board (EQB) has the power
and duty to adopt rules and regulations to accomplish the Act's
purposes and carry out its provisions. 55
The EQB enacted the RWRs to flesh out the SWMA by specify-
ing general procedures and rules for residual waste processing, dis-
48. See Slawek v. State Bd. of Med. Educ. & Licensure, 586 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa.
1991) (noting when reviewing courts may interfere with agency decision).
49. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6018.101-.103 (West 2003) (explaining history and
enactment of SWMA); see also Hofmann & Horst, supra note 44, at 177 (noting
history of SWMA).
50. See Hofmann & Horst, supra note 44, at 178 (defining scope of SWMA).
51. See Hofinann & Horst, supra note 44, at 178 (noting that applicability ini-
tially hinges on whether conduct involves waste by definition of statute).
52. See 35 PA.STAT. ANN. § 6018.103 (defining "solid waste" as "[a]ny waste,
including but not limited to, municipal, residual or hazardous wastes, including
solid, liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous materials.").
53. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6018.102 (West 2003) (declaring policy and legisla-
tive findings in enacting SWMA).
54. See id. § 6018.102(1)-(2) (listing purposes of SWMA).
55. See Hofmann & Horst, supra note 44, at 178 (noting means for implement-
ing SWMA); see also 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6018.104 (delegating regulation of stor-
age, collection, transportation, processing, treatment and disposal of solid waste to
DEP); see id. § 6018.105(a) (delegating adoption of rules, regulations, criteria and
standards under SWMA to EQB).
2009]
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posal, transportation, collection and storage. 56 In setting the
applicability of the RWRs, the term "waste" is defined broadly as:
(i) Discarded material which is recycled or abandoned. A
waste is abandoned by being disposed of, burned or
incinerated or accumulated, stored or processed
before or in lieu of being abandoned by being dis-
posed of, burned or incinerated ....
(ii) Materials that are not waste when recycled include
materials when they can be shown to be recycled by
being:
(A) Used or reused as ingredients in an industrial
process to make a product or employed in a par-
ticular function or application as an effective sub-
stitute for a commercial product, provided the
materials are not being reclaimed . . . . Sizing,
shaping or sorting of the material will not be con-
sidered processing for the purpose of the sub-
clause of the definition.
(B) Coproducts
(C) Returned to the original process from which they
are generated, without first being reclaimed or
land disposed .... 57
In applying this definition, pertinent sections of the RWRs ex-
pressly prohibit a person from operating a residual waste processing
facility without first receiving a permit from the DEP.58
C. Pennsylvania Case Law Defining Used Tires as Waste Under
the SWMA
In 1992, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania addressed
whether a waste storage and disposal facility violated the SWMA by
collecting tires from various commercial tire dealers and storing
them in large, unfenced piles on the surface of its property without
a permit.59 In Starr v. Department of Environmental Resources (Starr),60
the Department of Environmental Resources (DER) issued an NOV
to the petitioner facility on the premise that discarded tires consti-
56. See 25 PA. CODE § 287.2 (2001) (specifying scope of RWRs).
57. Id. § 287.1 (defining "waste").
58. See 25 PA. CODE § 293.201 (2001) (citing basic limitations and permit re-
quirements of RWRs).
59. See Starr v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 607 A.2d 321, 323 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)
(stating issue of case).
60. 607 A.2d 321, 323 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
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tuted "solid waste" under the SWMA.61 Petitioner contended that
used tires were not "municipal waste" because they were a "marketa-
ble commodity capable of being profitably recycled for various fur-
ther uses."'62 The court rejected this argument, stating that the
assumption runs contrary to the express legislative policy of the
SWMA to correct unacceptable solid waste practices for the public's
sake.63 In holding that the DER properly classified used tires as
municipal waste subject to regulation, the court further noted the
value-based analysis proposed by petitioner ignored the "absurd re-
sult that a party could escape environmental regulations by simply
declaring [its] waste has value." 64
A month after the Commonwealth Court decided Starr, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania addressed whether used tires should
be regulated under the SWMA. In Booher v. Department of Environ-
mental Resources (Booher),65 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted petition for review of an EHB order on the grounds that
petitioner lawfully disposed of used tires on his property because
the SWMA and associated RWRs did not expressly include used
tires as waste. 66 The court cited Starr in holding that an accumula-
tion of waste tires constitutes "municipal waste. '6 7 As petitioner fa-
cility never obtained authorization from the DEP to store tires on
his property, the EHB did not err in holding that the facility unlaw-
fully deposited municipal waste in violation of the SWMA. 68
More recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed
the inclusion of used tires under the RWR's definition of waste. In
61. See id. at 322 (noting that DER considered discarded tires to be "waste"
under SWMA).
62. Id. at 323 (stating petitioner's main contention that discarded tires were
not waste); see also 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6018.103 (defining "municipal waste" as
"[a]ny garbage, refuse, industrial lunchroom or office waste and other material
including solid.. .material resulting from operation of residential, municipal, com-
mercial or industrial establishments and from community activities. . . ").
63. See Starr, 607 A.2d at 323 (rejecting contention that used tires are not
waste because they are capable of being recycled for future use); see also 35
PA.STAT. ANN. § 6018.102 (stating legislative policy behind SWMA).
64. Star, 607 A.2d at 324 (discussing problems with petitioner's value-based
analysis).
65. 612 A.2d 1098 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
66. See id. at 1101 (outlining contentions of charged facility). The petitioner
was charged with accumulating tires and operating a solid waste storage, process-
ing or disposal facility on his property without a permit in violation of § 601 (1)-(2)
of the SWMA. Id. at 1100. Following receipt of a NOV from the DER, petitioner
continued accumulating tires, amassing approximately 200,000 byJuly 6, 1989. Id.
67. See id. at 1102 (noting recent holding of Starr as including waste tires
under definition of municipal waste).
68. See id. (rejecting petitioner's contention that he was not guilty of opening
and operating unlawful dumping and disposal facility in violation of SWMA).
2009]
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Commonwealth v. Packer (Packer),69 the court found the defendant
equipment operator guilty of dumping solid waste without a permit
when he buried waste tires on his employer's property. 70 In ad-
dressing whether an employee can be criminally liable for violating
the SWMA, the court acknowledged that RWR language classifies
an accumulation of waste tires as "residual waste" and consequently
read that classification into the SWMA.71
D. Strict Liability and the SWMA
When the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the SWMA,
it included provisions for strict criminal liability to facilitate prose-
cution by allowing liability without evidence of intent.72 Section
6018.606(i) of the Act evidences the state's intent to dispense with a
common law mens rea requirement and impose strict liability for
specified offenses, including two of the SWMA's most frequently vi-
olated provisions. 73 Violations of the SWMA are considered "public
welfare offenses," justifying liability regardless of intent when viola-
tion "impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the so-
cial order" and "consequences are injurious or not according to
fortuity. ' 74 Typically, public welfare offense statutes regulate "dan-
gerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste
materials." 75 As the accused is usually in a position to prevent viola-
tion, courts have upheld strict liability in this context because pen-
alties are generally small and conviction does not greatly damage an
offender's reputation. 76
The roots of strict liability for environmental crimes in Penn-
sylvania extend as far back as the 1907 case Commonwealth v. Immel
69. 798 A.2d 192 (Pa. 2002).
70. See id. at 194-97 (holding used tire fits under definition of waste found in
RWRs and SWMA).
71. See id. at 196-97 (citing definitions of waste under regulations and tying
them to SWMA).
72. See 35 PA.STAT. ANN. § 6018.606 (West 2003) (outlining strict liability for
certain SWMA violations).
73. See id. § 6018.606(i) (including §§ 6018.401 and 6018.610 in strict liability
scheme).
74. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (discussing public
welfare offenses).
75. United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65
(1971) (analyzing probability of awareness that chemicals at issue were
dangerous).
76. See id. (stating justification for eliminating mens rea element from public
welfare offenses).
10
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(Immel) . 7 7 In Immel, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
the defendant's conviction for polluting local waters and held that
the requisite intent to place a poisonous substance in a water source
did not necessarily require intent to harm the environment. 78 By
maintaining liability for damage done to local fish through harmful
discharge, regardless of whether a defendant intended such harm,
the court reasoned, "a sane man is presumed to intend the neces-
sary or the natural consequences of his voluntary acts. '79 Roughly
eighty-five years later, shortly before the enactment of the SWMA,
environmental catastrophe nearly struck central Pennsylvania, evi-
dencing a dire need for strong criminal penalties and strict liabil-
ity.80  In Commonwealth v. Scatena,81 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania convicted multiple corporate and non-corporate de-
fendants under the Pennsylvania Clean Stream Law for dumping
untreated industrial and chemical wastes down a borehole con-
nected to the Susquehanna River.8 2 The court held the widespread
pollution of a major water source resulting from the discharge in
question was enough in itself to establish liability.83
Yet, the strict liability provisions of the SWMA are often chal-
lenged on due process grounds, most commonly as being void for
vagueness for not sufficiently defining an offense so that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and avoid arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement.8 4 Due process of law is satis-
fied in this regard if the statute at issue "contains reasonable
77. 33 Pa. Super 388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1906) (addressing strict liability in water
pollution context).
78. See Andrew Christ, Comment, Due Process Challenges to the Strict Criminal
Liability Provisions of Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act, 13 PENN ST. ENVTL.
L. REv. 105, 107-08 (2004) (discussing roots of strict liability for environmental
crimes in Pennsylvania).
79. Immel, 33 Pa. Super. at 394 (upholding convictions upon showing that
defendant unlawfully and willfully discharged poisonous substances into Common-
wealth waters). In Immel, the court upheld liability and did not require a specific
showing that "the accused was impelled thereto by an evil motive to destroy the
fish." Id.
80. See Christ, supra note 78, at 108 (discussing Pittston Borehole Case and its
place in development of strict liability for environmental crimes in Pennsylvania).
81. 498 A.2d 1314 (Pa. 1985).
82. See id. at 1314-15 (citing facts of case). Despite containment efforts, an oil
sheen spread from bank to bank thirty-five miles downstream from the point of
discharge. Id. Contamination threatened the nearby town of Danville, Penn-
sylvania, roughly sixty miles downstream. Id.
83. See id. at 1317 (noting imposition of liability and reasoning behind
imposition).
84. See Christ, supra note 78, at 118 (introducing due process challenges to
strict criminal liability provisions of SWMA on grounds of being void for
vagueness).
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standards to guide the prospective conduct."85 In Baumgardner Oil
Company v. Commonwealth (Baumgardner),8 6 the petitioner oil-
processing facility argued that the strict liability provisions of the
SWMA were too vague to give fair notice.8 7 The Commonwealth
Court rejected this contention, holding that the definitions within
the SWMA provided sufficient guidance for an ordinary person to
understand the extent of prohibited conduct.88
Moreover, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recently
affirmed the constitutionality of SWMA strict liability with regard to
vagueness in Commonwealth v. Farmer,89 upholding the Act's applica-
bility to a petroleum treatment facility.90 The facility claimed its
processing was not overtly hazardous and various agency interpreta-
tions of the SWMA made the Act fatally overbroad. 91 Relying on
the reasoning of Baumgardner and other associated cases, the court
upheld strict liability under the SWVMA as constitutional. 92
The petitioner in Baumgardner also challenged strict liability
under the SWMA as imposing unconstitutionally harsh sanctions
for a strict liability statute.9 3 The court rejected this claim as well,
holding that the penalties under the SWMA are no harsher than
those found in other federal strict liability statutes deemed constitu-
tional.94 In support of this reasoning, the court cited United States v.
Freed (Freed),95 where the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a strict liability statute that imposed fines of up
to $10,000 and maximum imprisonment for up to ten years for pos-
85. Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d 244, 246 (Pa. 1976) (discussing
limits of due process with regard to vagueness).
86. 606 A.2d 617 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
87. See id. at 620 (arguing vagueness of SWMA provisions), appeal denied, 612
A.2d 986 (Pa. 1992). Baumgardner Oil Company (BOC) collected used oil,
reprocessing it for sale as fuel oil. Id. at 619. BOC was charged with Unlawful
Management of Hazardous Waste, a second-degree felony, and several related mis-
demeanors. Id. at 620.
88. See id. at 622-23 (discussing whether statute should be void for vagueness).
89. 750 A.2d 925 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
90. See id. at 929 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (upholding reasoning of
Baumgardner).
91. See id. (stating contentions of facility that provisions of SWMA were
overbroad).
92. See id. (noting consistent affirmation of certain strict liability enactments).
93. See Baumgardner, 606 A.2d at 621 (stating issue raised in case that SWMA
sanctions were overly harsh).
94. See id. at 625 (comparing regulation at issue to federal possession of unre-
gistered firearm). While due process may set some limits on the imposition of
strict criminal liability, the United States Supreme Court has yet to expound any
definite guidelines for curtailment. Id.
95. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
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session of an unregistered firearm. 96 In Freed, the Court affirmed
multiple convictions for possessing and conspiring to possess unre-
gistered hand grenades in violation of the National Firearms Act
(NFA) .97 The Court upheld strict liability in that instance because
the regulatory measure was in the interest of public safety and it was
reasonable to assume the statute provided adequate notice of the
conduct's illegality. 98
In contrast to Freed, another federal opinion rejected the ap-
propriateness of strict liability for felony conviction. In Staples v.
United States (Staples),99 the United States Supreme Court reversed a
conviction under the NFA for possession of an unregistered
machinegun because, unlike possession of hand grenades, posses-
sion of a gun does not sufficiently notify its possessor of the likeli-
hood of regulation.100 By requiring the government to prove mens
rea, the Court distinguished the case from other precedent that af-
firmed strict liability under statutes regulating potentially harmful
or injurious items.101 The Court further justified its rejection of
strict liability by citing the potentially harsh penalty of up to ten
years of imprisonment for violation of the provision at issue.10 2
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the scope of
strict liability prosecution in Packer.10 3 By channeling the overarch-
ing goals of the SWMA, the court upheld strict criminal liability for
any person dumping or depositing waste, including employees of
96. See Baumgardner, 606 A.2d at 621 (citing Freed as support); see also Freed, 401
U.S. at 612 (upholding constitutionality of strict liability for possessing and con-
spiring to possess unregistered hand grenades in violation of National Firearms
Act). See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952) (noting growing list of
exceptions to mens rea requirements, particularly in areas affecting public health,
safety and welfare).
97. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 604-05 (noting motion to dismiss granted in lower
court).
98. See id. at 609 (discussing adequacy of notice provided by statute). "[O] ne
would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an
innocent act." Id.
99. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
100. See id. at 618 (reversing conviction under NFA where notice was insuffi-
cient to justify strict liability).
101. See id. at 610-11 (reading mens rea requirement into section of NFA).
The Court noted that guns in general are not "deleterious devices or products or
obnoxious waste materials." Id. at 607 (quoting United States v. International Min-
erals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971)).
102. See id. at 616 (considering harsh penalty attached to violation). A pen-
alty imposed under a statute is traditionally regarded as a "significant considera-
tion in determining whether the statute should be construed as dispensing with
mens rea." Id.
103. 798 A.2d 192, 198 (Pa. 2002) (upholding strict liability under SWMA).
"[T]he General Assembly did not intend to limit liability ... to only those individu-
als who have the duty to obtain a permit for dumping solid waste." Id.
2009]
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waste disposal facilities. 10 4 By not expressly limiting the liability to
those with a duty to obtain a permit, the court reasoned that the
General Assembly intended to punish all persons involved in the
illegal dumping of solid waste' 0 5 and imposing liability in this man-
ner would be consistent with the purposes of the SWMA.106 Never-
theless, a dissenting opinion in Packer expressed concern over the
classification of SWMA violations as public welfare offenses, as such
convictions carry harsh penalties and can be subsequently injurious
to one's reputation. 0 7 Accordingly, affirmative defenses and spe-
cific jury instructions can appropriately alleviate these real effects of
SWVIA violation.'08
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Tire Jockey Service, Inc. v. DEP, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania reinstated the EHB's order against TJS, finding that the
trial court should have deferred to the DEP's interpretation, as up-
held by the EHB, because it was reasonable and consistent with the
RWRs. 109 In reaching its decision, the court looked at past holdings
and held that the plain language of the regulation exempted mate-
rial from classification as waste at the time it is recycled, not before-
hand.' 10 Since used tires accumulated by TJS were not an
ingredient in an industrial process or immediately usable as an ef-
fective substitute for a commercial product without some form of
processing, the court held that the tires did not qualify for excep-
tion under the definition of waste and the trial court erred in hold-
ing otherwise."'
In addition, the court rejected the Commonwealth Court's
holding that the SWMA does not apply to TJS because they do not
"process" or "reclaim" waste material, but merely size, sort and
104. See id. (holding legislature did not intend to limit liability under SWMA).
105. See id. at 199 (rationalizing reading of SWMA to apply to all involved in
dumping solid waste without permit).
106. See id. at 198 (justifying imposition of liability); see also 35 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 6018.102(4), (10) (West 2003) (citing legislative intent behind enactment of
SWMA).
107. See Packer, 798 A.2d at 201 (Saylor, J., dissenting in part) (disagreeing
with classification of SWMA violation as public welfare offense).
108. See id. (noting repercussions of conviction under SWMA).
109. See Tire Jockey Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 915 A.2d 1165, 1191 (Pa.
2007) (citing holding of case).
110. See id. at 1187-88 (referencing precedent for including accumulation of
used tires under definition of waste in SWMA); see also infra notes 59-71 and accom-
panying text.
111. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1189 (agreeing with DEP that TJS's used tires
did not fit under exception to definition of waste).
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shape it, which is expressly exempted from the definition of
waste. 112 According to the Supreme Court, TJS's conduct consti-
tutes sufficient processing to fall outside the exception.'
13
A. Exception for Materials Used or Reused in an Industrial
Process or as an Effective Substitute for a Commercial
Product
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that TJS's used tires
are indeed waste and deference is owed to the DEP's interpretation
of the RWRs because: (1) the regulations were consistent with the
SWMA and properly issued in line with legislative rule-making
power and procedure; 114 and (2) the DEP interpretation was rea-
sonable.1 15 Neither party contested the promulgation of the regu-
lation at issue and its consistency with the SWMA.1 16 In addition,
the court recognized that the DEP's stature as an enforcement
branch of the state's environmental administration puts it in the
best position to interpret environmental regulations."
7
The court then assessed the reasonableness of the DEP's posi-
tion that TJS's operations do not fall under an exception to the
definition of waste even if the used tires have a potential to be re-
used or recycled. 118 The court held legislative findings behind the
SWMA supported the inclusion of used tires as waste, noting that
112. See id. at 1190 (rejecting contention that TJS's used tires fit under excep-
tion for sizing, shaping or sorting).
113. See id. (noting that TJS processed tires to sufficient degree). TJS fell
outside of the exception because its tires were not "ready for use as an effective
substitute for a commercial product or as an ingredient in an industrial process."
Id.
114. See id. at 1186-87 (noting undisputed point that regulation is consistent
with SWMA).
115. See id. at 1186 (citing test for agency deference). Regulations adopted
pursuant to an agency's legislative power are valid and binding upon courts so
long as they are: (a) adopted within the agency's granted power; (b) issued pursu-
ant to proper procedure; and (c) reasonable. Id.
116. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1186 (discussing adequacy of RWRs).
"[N]either party disputes that the regulation is consistent with the SWMA, was
adopted within the granted power or was issued pursuant to proper procedure."
Id. Review must ensure that courts do not substitute their own judgment for that
of an agency with legislative rule-making power. Id. In addition, a pronounce-
ment must be so at odds with fundamental principles as to be an expression of
whim rather than an exercise ofjudgment in order to qualify as abuse of legislative
power. Id.
117. See id. at 1187 (describing DEP as having "the greatest working knowl-
edge of and practical experience with the environmental regulations."); see also 35
PA.STAT. ANN. § 6018.104 (West 2003) (stating DEP's duty to administer and en-
force solid waste management program).
118. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1188 (assessing reasonableness of DEP
interpretation).
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improper waste practices can lead to public health hazards, envi-
ronmental pollution and economic loss.119
The court also recognized that precedent supported the inclu-
sion of used tires under the SWMA's definition of waste. 120 In Starr,
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania upheld a similar conten-
tion to avoid a public health hazard and enjoin parties from escap-
ing regulation by simply declaring their waste had value.12' The
court's reasoning in Starr, holding the accumulation of used tires
fell under SWMA regulation, was approved by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Booher and more recently in Packer.122
Finally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania looked at the plain
language of the exception at issue and noted its construction as
exempting waste "when recycled," not before. 123 The court held
that the exception only applies to materials that are presently ready
for use as ingredients in an industrial process or as effective substi-
tutes for commercial products without any processing.124 The
court noted that TJS processes its used tires to some degree when it
visually inspects and pressure tests all incoming tires. 125 This corre-
sponds with the RWR definition of processing because TJS methods
were "used for the purpose of reducing the volume or ... to con-
vert part or all of the waste materials for offsite reuse."126 In addi-
tion, the court doubted TJS's used tires can be considered
ingredients in an industrial operation as addressed by the RWRs. 127
No part of its operations involve an ingredient, defined as part of a
119. See id. (citing General Assembly finding that equates poor solid waste
practices with harm to public health, safety and welfare); see also 35 PA.STAT. ANN.
§ 6018.102 (West 2003) (listing purposes of SWMA).
120. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1187-88 (noting that court had previously con-
sidered accumulation of used tires "waste" under SWMA).
121. See Starr v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 607 A.2d 321, 323-24 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1992) (citing reasons for rejecting petitioner's value-based analysis as removing
used tires from definition of waste).
122. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's application of Starr
in subsequent cases, see supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
123. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1189 (addressing plain language of regula-
tion's definition of "waste"); see also 25 PA. CODE § 287.1 (2008) (stating exception
under definition of waste).
124. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1189 (interpreting express language of
regulation).
125. See id. (recognizing processing functions at TJS). Some tires are further
sized, sorted, shaped, cut, shredded and baled. Id.
126. 25 PA. CODE § 287.1 (2008) (defining "processing").
127. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1189 (addressing whether used tires can be
considered ingredients in industrial operation).
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mixture or compound, because the used tires are cut into new and
separate products.
128
B. Exemption for "Sizing, Shaping or Sorting"
The court next addressed whether TJS operations could meet
the "sizing, shaping or sorting" exception to processing under the
definition of "waste," as found by the Commonwealth Court.129 For
the exception to apply, the used tires must be ready for use as an
effective substitute for a commercial product or ingredient in an
industrial process. 130 As the reusable tires at TJS's facility required
processing before meeting this requirement, the exception cannot
apply13 1
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Tire Jockey as Progression of Historical Support for Strong
Environmental Regulation
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Tire Jockey, as
viewed alongside its decisions in Booher and Packer, illustrates a con-
scious effort by the state to uphold and strengthen its environmen-
tal regulatory scheme.1 32  By sustaining the DEP's narrow
interpretation of the simple term "waste," the court supported the
enforcement power of the DEP and ensured that overreaching ex-
ceptions to the statutory law do not eviscerate its oversight.1 33 This
strong stance is justified by the Pennsylvania Constitution itself,
which asserts that the state's "people have a right to clean air, pure
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment."1 3 4 This principle was incorpo-
rated and expounded upon in the SWMA so as to "protect the pub-
128. See id. (comparing TJS operations with dictionary definition of "ingredi-
ent"). American Heritage Dictionary defines ingredient as "an element in a mix-
ture or compound." Id. (internal citations omitted).
129. See id. at 1190 (addressing whether TJS operations can be classified
under exception to waste for sizing, shaping or sorting).
130. See id. (noting requirements of exception).
131. For a further discussion of the court's reasoning regarding exceptions,
see supra notes 118-131 and accompanying text.
132. See Tire Jockey, 915 A.2d at 1190 (noting that DEP interpretation properly
implements purpose of SWMA).
133. See id. (supporting holding by noting fear of evisceration of DEP power
to enforce law).
134. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (noting Pennsylvania's general stance on environ-
mental conservation). "[T]he Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain [pub-
lic natural resources] for the benefit of all the people." Id. The Pennsylvania
Constitution also notes that the state's natural resources represent "the common
property of all the people, including generations yet to come." Id.
2009]
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lic health, safety and welfare from the short and long term dangers
of transportation, processing, treatment, storage and disposal of all
wastes."' 35 Broad inclusion of materials under the definition of
"waste" is also justified by the state's express desire to "provide a
flexible and effective means to implement and enforce the provi-
sions of [the SWMA]." 1 3 6
TireJockey furthers strong policy initiatives established in other
areas of the law to bolster the state's environmental regulatory
scheme. The Pennsylvania General Assembly established a sharp
strict liability scheme under the SWMA, going as far as making it a
felony for violating the Act.1 37 In creating strict liability offenses,
the Pennsylvania legislature manifested its intent to uphold liability
for harm caused even if a violator uses the utmost care. 138 Strict
liability under the SWMA persists in Pennsylvania jurisprudence de-
spite fervent attacks for being inconsistent with the traditional mo-
res of the legal principle; namely that penalties for violations be
small and convictions not substantially damaging to the offender's
reputation. 139
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Baum-
gardner serves as the state's seminal proclamation against challenges
to strict liability for violations of the SWMA. 40 In upholding the
constitutionality of strict liability in this context, the court main-
tained that: (1) the definitions contain reasonable enough stan-
dards for an ordinary person to understand what conduct is
prohibited by the SWMA;14' and (2) the penalties at issue are no
harsher than those found in other federal strict liability statutes
135. 35 PA.STAT. ANN. § 6018.102(4) (West 2003) (outlining purpose of
SWMA).
136. Id. § 6018.102(5) (citing legislative desire for flexible means to effec-
tively enforce SWIA).
137. See id. § 6018.606(0 (outlining felony offense for anyone who stores,
transports, treats or disposes of hazardous waste within Commonwealth).
138. See id. § 6018.401(b) (extending liability related to "storage, transporta-
tion, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste" even if violator "exercised utmost
care to prevent harm"); see also Christ, supra note 78, at 116-17 (discussing public
welfare offenses). Strict liability for public welfare offenses is predicated on a duty
to society to refrain from causing harm, whereby the actual infliction of harm usu-
ally depends on mere chance. Id. at 117-18.
139. See Christ, supra note 78, at 117 (discussing primary justification for al-
lowing exceptions to mens rea requirement of offense).
140. See id. at 120-21 (discussing Baumgardner and legality of strict liability).
141. See Baumgardner Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, 606 A.2d 617, 622-23 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992) (discussing whether strict liability statute should be void for
vagueness).
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deemed constitutional. 142 Interestingly, the Baumgardner court re-
lied on Freed to support the latter point, a case that broadly inter-
preted conduct falling under the definition of a public welfare
offense and associated strict liability classification.143 By choosing
the Freed interpretation over the strict construction of the term ad-
vocated in Staples, the Commonwealth Court firmly established its
view of waste dumping as clearly encompassing "deleterious devices
or ... obnoxious waste materials" sufficient to provide owners with
notice that they are responsible to the public to prevent hazards.'
44
As the United States Supreme Court has yet to expound definite
limits to strict criminal liability, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania's support of the SWMA's strict liability provisions shows le-
gitimate conviction in the face of contrary positions.'
45
Yet, recent case law questions the continued validity of SWMA
strict liability as a traditional public welfare offense. In Packer, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania persisted in upholding the constitu-
tionality of strict liability for SWMA violations, but a partially dis-
senting opinion voiced disapproval. 146 Specific exception was taken
with the classification of the SWMA as a public welfare offense, a
categorization that historically required minimal penalties and
slight overall impact on offenders to justify imposition of liability
without intent.' 47 The Packer dissent advocated the use of affirma-
tive defenses and enhanced jury instructions instead of strict liabil-
ity, since the large penalties, i.e., long prison sentences and injury
to professional or community reputation associated with SWMA vio-
142. See id. at 625 (comparing regulation at issue to federal possession of un-
registered firearm).
143. Compare United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971) (upholding strict
liability for possessing hand grenades in violation of National Firearms Act where
regulatory measure was in interest of public safety and provided reasonable notice
that conduct prohibited was reasonably implied), with Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600, 618 (1994) (reversing conviction for possession of unregistered
machinegun in violation of National Firearms Act because, unlike possession of
hand grenades, gun possession does not sufficiently notify possessor of likelihood
of regulation).
144. United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1971)
(describing conduct classified as public welfare offense); see also supra notes 93-98
and accompanying text.
145. See United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 433-34 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1019 (1987) (indicating that while some limits on imposition of strict
liability may exist, Court does not definitively state guidelines).
146. See Commonwealth v. Packer, 798 A.2d 192, 201-02 (Pa. 2002) (Saylor, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (disagreeing on applicability of strict liability).
147. See id. at 201 (citing harshness of SWMA strict liability penalties). A first-
time violation of SWMA § 610 is classified as a third-degree misdemeanor, carrying
potential penalties of up to one year in prison and a fine between $1,000 and
$25,000 per day for each violation. Id.
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lation, seem to belie the appropriateness of strict liability. 148 While
the dissenting justice did not weigh in on the ultimate constitution-
ality of the SWMA's strict liability provisions, this skepticism sug-
gests an uncertainty that may hinder Pennsylvania's future efforts to
uphold its firm environmental position.1 49
Though the Commonwealth Court's decision in Baumgardner
seems inapposite to its initiative in Tire Jockey, it evidences an over-
arching state policy to stand behind environmental regulation as a
means to support important legislative initiatives.' 50 Numerous
Pennsylvania decisions have cemented this position, and recent
questioning of strict liability under the SWMA necessitates reaffir-
mation of the court's commitment to environmental regulation.151
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Tire Jockey, there-
fore, furthers the state's continued support of strict liability as a
furtherance of environmental steadfastness.
B. TireJockey as Evidence of a Pragmatic Approach to Solid
Waste Regulation in Pennsylvania
The particular dangers of the waste involved in Tire Jockey fur-
ther illustrate the need for broad regulation in Pennsylvania to en-
sure dangerous residual waste does not evade regulation. Used
tires, when accumulated, hold the frightening potential to catch
fire and significantly threaten the surrounding environment. 152
The chemical composition of petroleum-based tires makes them
highly flammable, while their donut shape creates an airflow that
can aggressively feed and sustain a blazing fire. 153 Large tire fires
can sometimes take as long as a year to extinguish, as evidenced by
a 1998 blaze in California that consumed roughly seven million dis-
carded tires.' 54 Burning tires affect the environment by producing
hazardous smoke, causing showers of soot miles away from the burn
148. See id. at 202 (foreshadowing availability of limited affirmative defenses as
future issue with regard to SWMA strict liability).
149. See id. (withholding decision on constitutional questions for case where
adequate record is presented).
150. For a discussion of constitutional questions and interplay with legislative
initiatives, see supra notes 59-108 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent relating to
strict liability, see supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
152. See Brian Dunn, The Mexicali Tire Pile: Smoke on the Horizon?, 14 GEo.
INT'L. ENvrL. L. REv. 409, 412 (2001) (discussing dangers of tire piles to
environment).
153. See id. (explaining flammability of used tires).
154. See id. (referencing tire fire in Tracy, California, where spark from farm
machinery started one of nation's largest and longest running tire fires).
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site. 155 These fires also produce an oily runoff that contaminates
nearby streams and aquifers. 15 6
Another problem associated with large accumulations of used
tires is mosquitoes.1 5 7 Stagnant pools of water can create a flourish-
ing breeding ground for the disease-carrying insects. 158 This threat
is especially meaningful for Pennsylvanians, as the original North
American breeding ground for the deadly West Nile Virus was in
fact located in a tire dump in Scranton, Pennsylvania. 15 9 Infected
mosquitoes are the primary source of the virus and become com-
municable when they feed on infected birds, thereby transferring
the virus to humans and animals when taking blood. 160 Roughly
twenty percent of infected persons will experience mild symptoms
such as fever and nausea, while about one in one hundred fifty in-
fected persons experience permanent neurological damage some-
times resulting in death. 16 1
Though not explicitly mentioned in the opinion, the effects of
this widespread viral epidemic may have loomed over the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Tire Jockey to include used tires
under the definition of waste, thereby ensuring regulation and
proper damage control. The EHB adjudicated Tire Jockey at the
close of 2002, a year that realized 4,156 reported cases of human
West Nile Virus infection and 284 fatalities nationally, as compared
to only 149 cases of infection and eighteen fatalities from 1999 to
2001.162 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reinstated the EHB's
order in early 2007 after hearing arguments nearly two years ear-
155. See id. (referencing fire in Sacramento, California, where "a black plume
of smoke 3,000 miles high" deposited soot miles from blaze).
156. See id. (referencing tire fire in Wyandot County, Ohio, where oily runoff
carrying traces of benzene killed aquatic life in seven mile stretch of creek).
157. See Dunn, supra note 152, at 412 (discussing threat of mosquito breeding
in tire piles).
158. See id. (describing conditions attractive to mosquitoes for breeding).
159. See id. (noting West Nile Virus originated in Pennsylvania tire pile).
160. See CDC, West Nile Virus: What You Need to Know, http://www.cdc.gov/
ncidod/dvbid/westnile/wnvfactsheet.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (describing
spread of virus).
161. See id. (noting both serious and mild symptoms of virus); see also CDC,
Background: Viral History and Distribution, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/
westnile/background.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (describing history of virus).
The most serious manifestations of West Nile Virus are human meningitis and en-
cephalitis, or inflammation of the spinal cord and brain, respectively. Id. The
virus first appeared in North America in 1999, with encephalitis reported in both
humans and horses. Id.
162. See CDC, 2002 West Nile Virus Activity in the United States, http://www.
cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/surv&controlCaseCount02_detailed.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2008) (citing 2002 statistics both nationally and by state). The Center
for Disease Control and Prevention notes that of the 4,156 reported cases in 2002,
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lier, in perfect posture to recognize 2003's national record of 9,862
reported cases of human West Nile Virus infection and associated
Pennsylvanian records of 237 reported cases of infection and eight
fatalities. 16-1 Statistics for the years 2004 through 2006, while not at
the epidemic levels of 2003, were still significant enough to warrant
the court's concern.1 64 In addition, the virus also affected the
country's horse population during this time period, even causing
death in some cases. 16 5
VI. IMPACT
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's holding in Tire Jockey
maintains the broad applicability of residual waste oversight and en-
sures that dangerous processing facilities will not slip by unregu-
lated.' 66 Moreover, this policy is consistent with the Pennsylvania
Constitution and legislative intent behind the SWMA.167 Addi-
tional support is found in recent environmental case law168 which
reaffirms the dangers associated with the particular waste material
for which exclusion is sought. 169 By accepting narrow readings of
environmental statutory language, Pennsylvania courts create less
leeway for circumvention, ensuring that dangerous waste disposal
71% were reported as the neuroinvasive diseases meningitis or encephalitis while
28% were reported as the milder West Nile fever. Id.
163. See CDC, 2003 West Nile Virus Activity in the United States, http://www.
cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/surv&controlCaseCount03_detailed.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2008) (citing 2003 statistics both nationally and by state). The Center
for Disease Control and Prevention notes that of the 9,862 reported cases in 2003,
69% were reported as the milder West Nile fever while 29% were reported as the
neuroinvasive diseases meningitis or encephalitis. Id.
164. See CDC, 2004 West Nile Virus Activity in the United States, http://www.
cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/surv&controlCaseCount04_detailed.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2008) (citing 2,539 cases reported and 100 fatalities nationally in
2004); see also CDC, 2005 West Nile Virus Activity in the United States, http://www.
cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/surv&controlCaseCount05 detailed.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2008) (citing 3,000 cases reported and 119 fatalities nationally in
2005); CDC, 2006 West Nile Virus Activity in the United States, http://www.cdc.
gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/surv&controlCaseCount06 detailed.htm (last visited
Oct. 21, 2008) (citing 4,269 cases reported and 177 fatalities nationally in 2006).
165. See CDC, West Nile Virus and Horses, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
dvbid/westnile/qa/wnvhorses.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (discussing issues
involving West Nile Virus infection in horses).
166. For a narrative analysis of the court's reasoning, see supra notes 109-131
and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of the constitution and the legislative intent behind the
SWMA, see supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
168. For a discussion of recent case law, see supra notes 59-71 and accompany-
ing text.
169. For a discussion of the dangers associated with the exclusion, see supra at
notes 152-165 and accompanying text.
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facilities realize their "highest duty of responsibility" to safeguard
the public from harm. 170 This overarching policy is evident in the
courts' treatment of strict liability under the SWMA, an issue con-
sistently upheld despite fervent challenge. 17'
Finally, Pennsylvania's deference to its administrative environ-
mental scheme can be viewed as a trend that will persist. Future
litigants challenging environmental provisions of Pennsylvania law
should expect treatment in line with the state's firm support of en-
vironmental initiatives like strict criminal liability1 72 and narrow
readings of statutory exceptions to regulations.1 73  In addition,
Pennsylvania's stance parallels similar regulatory schemes of other
states with regard to used tires and other waste products. 174 The
willingness of Pennsylvania courts to back environmental goals with
such strength at this juncture is not only an encouraging prospect
for the future of the state's natural realm and well-being of its citi-
zens, but also a discouraging omen for prospective polluters.
Michael D. Beck*
170. See Commonwealth v. Farmer, 750 A.2d 925, 930 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)
(justifying harsh imposition of environmental liability under SWMA).
171. For a discussion of strict liability, see supra at notes 72-108 and accompa-
nying text.
172. See id.
173. For a general overview of the court's interpretation of the exceptions,
see supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
174. SeeJohn F. Bonfatti, Tired 7res: The Problem and Promise of Used Tires, BuF-
FALO NEWS, Nov. 20, 2000, at IA (discussing plight of New York State in addressing
used tire problems). As of 2000, it was estimated that nearly 24 million used tires
sat in tire dumps throughout New York, with another 12 to 15 million generated
each year. Id. Recent enactments have created a state Council on Scrap Tire Man-
agement and Recycling to help remedy the surplus of waste tires. Id. Florida re-
cently dealt with a similar problem, disposing of 25 million waste tires over seven
years. Id.
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Penn-
sylvania State University.
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